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82

USIB-D-16.2/54
29 December 1961

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Validity Study on NIE 32.5-59

The Outlook for an Independent Cyprus

dated 6 October 1959

The following validity study on NIE 32.5-59 was noted by the Intelligence Board on 28 December 1961 (USIB-M-192, item 11 b.).

NIE 32.5-59, "The Outlook for an Independent Cyprus", dated 6 October 1959, remained generally valid in its judgments on the principal trends of Cypriot affairs. It did, however, anticipate greater Communist influence in the government and greater obstruction by the former EOKA terrorists to the working of the government than actually occurred.



Executive Secretary

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90

USIB-D-16.2/53
8 December 1961


UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Validity Study on NIE 93-61

The Outlook for Brazil

dated 8 August 1961

The attached Validity Study on NIE 93-61 was noted by the
Intelligence Board on 7 December 1961 (USIB-M-188, item 11).



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91

USIB-D-16.2/52
24 November 1961

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Validity Studies on:

NIE 27.1-58, The Outlook for Spain


dated 20 May 1958

and

NIE 27.2-59, The Outlook for Portugal

dated 21 July 1959

The attached Validity Studies of NIE 27.1-58 and NIE 27.2-59 were noted by the Intelligence Board on 21 November 1961 (USIB-M-185, item 5. c.).



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USIB-D-16.2/52
24 November 1961

Validity Studies on:

NIE 27.1-58, The Outlook for Spain
dated 20 May 1958

and

NIE 27.2-59, The Outlook for Portugal
dated 21 July 1959

NIE 27.1-58

This estimate, prepared before the adoption of the stabilization program in 1959, has proven substantially accurate, although it was slightly over-pessimistic concerning the Spanish Government's willingness to undertake economic reforms. The basic judgments, that the regime would survive while Franco remained politically active, and that US interests would probably not be adversely affected during the period, have been borne out.

NIE 27.2-59

Although it was prepared before the "Santa Maria affair" and the outbreak of fighting in Angola, the basic judgments in this estimate have proved valid.

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USIB-D-16.2/50
12 July 1961

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Validity Study on NIE 55-59

The Outlook for Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim

dated 24 November 1959

The attached Validity Study of NIE 55-59 was noted by the
Intelligence Board on 5 July 1961 (USIB-M-163, item 9.b.).



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USIB-D-16.2/50
12 July 1961

Validity Study on NIE 55-59

The Outlook for Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim

dated 24 November 1959

The main estimates on Nepalese developments have held up reasonably well. NIE 55-59 correctly pointed out that the Nepali Congress Government probably would encounter its most serious difficulties in its relations with the monarchy, and that in the event of a showdown Mahendra probably would emerge on top. However, the showdown came sooner than we anticipated. Most of the assessment on the outlook for Nepal's foreign affairs also proved sound as long as the Nepali Congress remained in power, but since the King's coup Nepal has adopted a more cooperative attitude toward Communist China than was anticipated.

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